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On December 17th, 2014, President Obama announced that the United States would take the first
steps toward normalizing relations with Cuba. This policy shift opens both opportunities and
challenges for agencies of the U.S. government, including the military, as we move toward more
normal relations.
Internal Changes in Cuba
To understand the challenges and the opportunities, it is important to understand first that Cuba
itself is undergoing a process of internal reform.

The internal changes – described

euphemistically as “updatings” of the economic system--are intended to maintain political
stability and the current political system, in which the Communist Party is the dominant force,
while making the economy more productive, and generating economic growth.
Behind this reform process is the recognition by Cuban President Raul Castro that the
Cuban economy needs significant changes.

When Raul Castro succeeded his brother Fidel in

2006, he inherited an economy that had benefited from the Latin America wide commodities
boom, and that was benefitting from a privileged relationship with Venezuela and its oil reserves.
But it was an economy with deep structural problems, including extremely low levels of
productivity, a low level of internal investment and difficulties attracting foreign investment,
difficulties in access to international lending and credit, severe internal deficits in investment in
housing and other social goods, and wage stagnation that led to disillusionment for a populace
whose young people especially were aware of and eager for the advantages of the developed
economies.
None of these issues had brought Cuba to a crisis, and the country was not on the verge
of a social explosion. But Raul Castro appears to have concluded the structural problems were
critical, and that Cuba could not put off addressing them indefinitely. Unlike his brother Fidel,
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Raul Castro did not believe that calls to revolutionary commitment and sacrifice would be
enough to address economic discontent in the long run.
Castro moved deliberately to address the issues. He began first by making changes in the
senior leadership of the government and the Communist Party, ensuring that his supporters and
allies were in key positions, so that he would have the political, institutional, and bureaucratic
support to develop and implement a set of reforms.
In 2011, the Cuban Communist Party released a draft set of guidelines for an “updating”
of the Cuban economic model. These draft guidelines went through a set of reasonably broad
discussions at the grassroots level, involving Communist Party inspired community groups, trade
union locals, women’s groups, and others.

Following this consultative process, the guidelines

were revised, and then approved by the Party, and eventually by Cuba’s National Assembly.
The guidelines – there are 216 of them – propose a new model for the Cuban economy.
They envision a shift away from a state-run economy to a more mixed model. A small and midsize private sector will emerge, while the state will continue to control major industries and about
half of the economy (in contrast to the existing model in which the state controls almost all the
economy). State enterprises will shed surplus workers, and become more decentralized, and in
the process become more efficient and more productive. (Those workers will presumably be
absorbed in the new private sector). Centralized economic planning will be reduced, though
certainly not disappear, and both state enterprises and local governments will have more decision
making authority.

Foreign investment will play a bigger –though not unrestricted --role in the

economy, and modifications to the foreign investment law will be made to attract more investors.
The model envisions a greater integration of the Cuban economy into the international economy.
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In this conception, the Communist Party will continue to play the leading political role, in a
somewhat modified decision making structure.
The implementation of this reform plan has been slow, and complicated. The Cuban
government is not seeking a program of “shock therapy” or overnight change; Raul Castro has
repeatedly described his approach to reform as “without hurry but without stopping.” And
reform in Cuba, as in most economies, creates winners and losers, and thus supporters and
opponents.

So, state enterprises have shed workers far more slowly than was originally

envisioned, and they have gained less autonomy than had been expected by this date. Foreign
investments, though widely discussed, have been slow to be approved. Currency unification has
been repeatedly postponed. But the reform process has been moving ahead, and is expected to
continue.
For the Cuban leadership and economic planners, it is clear that an improved relationship
with the United States is critical to their long-term re-integration into the western hemisphere and
the broad international economy. International banking and finance is closely tied to the United
States, investors look to U.S. credit rating agencies and U.S. based insurers, and much
commercial activity is tied to U.S. trading networks. Moving toward a more normal relationship
with the U.S will facilitate Cuba’s reintegration into the international economy.
Changes in the U.S.-Cuban relationship
And so, as the Obama Administration began to deliberate about changing its approach to Cuba,
the Cuban political leadership came to conclude that an improved relationship with the United
States was a necessary complement to its internal economic restructuring.

The December 17th

announcement was made in that context, and the next steps in the normalization process will take
place in the context of the reform process in Cuba.

5
The overall improvement in relations is good for the national interest of the United
States. It removes a long-standing irritant in our relations in the region, even with close allies
and friendly governments. It takes away what was for many Latin Americans a symbol of
historic U.S. heavy-handedness in the region. It will depolarize a number of political issues,
particularly discussions about the future of the OAS and its relationship to CELAC and other
multi-lateral bodies. It will benefit the U.S. in other ways. While it may produce a short term
uptick in illegal migration, as Cubans who fear that normalization will end their special
preferences under the Cuban Adjustment Act try to come to the U.S., its long term impact is
likely to reduce migration flows, and particularly to reduce the fear of mass migration events.
It will likely reinforce and contribute to the process of economic reform in Cuba, and it
will likely support modest political reforms, as reduced U.S.-Cuban hostility makes it harder to
characterize reformers as undermining national unity.

The economic reform process in Cuba

will generate its own pressures for political opening, as a small but real private sector emerges
and as access to information and new information technologies increases.
Thus the U.S. will be contemplating new relationships with the Cuban government in the
context of an ongoing and dynamic process of internal reform, which will have some political as
well as economic implications.
The Cuban Military
What does this mean for developing relationships with the Cuban military?
Too little is known about the Cuban military. FIU Latin America and Caribbean program
director Frank Mora has written about the Cuban military, Canadian analyst Hal Klepak has
published on the subject, as has NDU professor Alex Crowther. The DIA has produced some
classified material. But it is still an understudied institution.
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This is particularly problematic because what is known about the Cuban military suggests
what a critical institution is it in the Cuban governance structure today, and reminds us that it is
likely to continue to be so in the near future.
The Cuban military is the leading force in national defense. Though far smaller than it
was in the 1970s and 1980s--both the number of troops and the size of the budget today are only
about a third of what they were in the late 1980s-- and no longer focused on projecting power
abroad, the Cuban military remains the key element in a system of national defense and
protection.
The military serves as a guarantor of the domestic political order, and are widely
perceived as loyal to the government and the political order. (When for example then-President
Fidel Castro fell ill, and Raul Castro became acting president, army troops were put on alert.)
That said, there is little history of the Cuban military carrying out domestic repression. In the
only known incident, in 1994, in the midst of serious economic difficulties, riots ensued along
the Havana waterfront and troops were called out to calm the situation. And thought the military
presence served to calm the situation, then-Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro was
uncomfortable deploying the military, reportedly commenting that the people needed more
foodstuffs not more bullets. While the ultimate guarantor of the political order, it is not clear that
troops would be willing to systematically repress citizens or fire on Cuban civilians, in the
probably unlikely event of a major internal crisis in the near future.
The Cuban military is the second most important actor in the Cuban political system,
after the Cuban Communist Party. President Raul Castro was the head of the military and the
Minister of the Armed Forces since the earliest years of the Cuban revolution.

His closest

advisors are military men who he has brought into positions of trust in the governmental
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structure. Most senior officials in the military are members of the Cuban Communist Party, and
exercise influence both as military officers and as Party members.
Along with its direct political role, the Cuban military is a key actor in the Cuban
economy.

Senior military officials who have shown their competence and are close to

President Castro have been placed in charge of a number of important ministries dealing with the
economy. More fundamentally, the armed forces are involved in production and services in the
Cuban economy. In the 1980s, a number of Cuban officers studied abroad, earning economics
and business management degrees in order to effectively manage the enterprises that engaged in
production for the military. When the national budget was sharply cut in the early 1990s, the
military responded by expanding the production of military industries, and moving into
agriculture, consumer goods production and other industrial sectors to make up the shortfall.
Today, a substantial share of state enterprises are owned and managed by the Ministry of the
Armed Forces (making the Armed Forces a force for improved economic management and
economic reform.)
Finally, the Cuban military is generally a respected institution in Cuban society. Most
Cubans have done military service, and view the armed forces positively. Its prestige is less than
it was years ago (like most Cuban institutions), and it faces challenges ensuring that its members
and its retirees have adequate housing and salaries (also like many Cuban institutions), especially
when compared to individuals working in the emerging private sector. Nonetheless it remains
relatively high levels of respect in society.
So the Cuban armed forces have defense and security roles, as well as key economic and
political roles, in the Cuban system.
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Both because so little is known about the Cuban military and how it functions, because of
its important roles in both national defense and the economic and political system, and because it
will play a significant role in the economic and political reforms that will take place in Cuba in
the years to come, it is important for the U.S. military to engage with and develop relationships
with their Cuban counterparts.
U.S.-Cuban Military Contacts
There are some U.S.-Cuban military contacts. There are monthly meetings at the fence line of
the Guantamano naval base between the U.S. base commander and the Cuban military
commander for the Guantanamo region. Both sides view these talks as useful and professional,
but they are focused on issues related to the naval base and local security issues, and deliberately
do not touch larger issues in the U.S.-Cuban relationship.
The Coast Guard has had a liaison officer in Havana since the late 1990s, whose job is to
serve as a point of contact between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard on issues
related to counter-narcotics, search and rescue at sea, and related maritime security issues. Over
the years, the successive Coast Guard liaison officers have developed a relatively high level of
communication and professional trust with their Cuban counterparts, and the U.S. government
has come to view the Border Guard and the Cuban government more broadly as serious and
professional in addressing counter-narcotics issues. In the last two years, Coast Guard – Border
Guard contact has expanded, including a visit to a Cuban port by a U.S. Coast Guard cutter, a
professional exchange in Cuba on identifying forged documents, a professional exchange in the
United States, and a tabletop exercise in the U.S. in which Cuban officials participated.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, several delegations of retired U.S. military officials
traveled to Cuba, and had dialogues with Cuban military research centers and some contact with
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active duty Cuban military officials. But those visits were suspended when relations became
more difficult under the George W. Bush administration, and have not been revived since. The
U.S. organization that organized the visits has closed, and several of the Cuban research centers
that focused on military and security issues have closed as well, in response to Cuban budgetary
pressures.
WOLA has taken a number of retired Coast Guard officials, congressional staff who
follow security issues, along with academic experts on security issues, to look at drug
cooperation and related security issues in Cuba, and has had a number of discussions with
Cuban academics, officials in the Ministry of the Interior, and in the Ministry of Foreign
Relations. In addition, WOLA staff have spoken at events in Cuba on security issues, with
Cuban military officers in attendance.
These contacts – at the fence line, through the Coast Guard, and through NGOs like
WOLA – are positive, but they are limited. Given the December 17th announcement, it may be
possible to build deeper contacts and greater engagement.
Encouragingly, there are signs that the Ministry of the Armed Forces would be interested
in greater dialogue with their U.S. counterparts.
In December of 2014, under a Treasury Department license, WOLA organized a short
course at the Center for the Study of International Policy (CIPI) for University of Havana
graduate students and alumni in the field of international relations.

CIPI is a research center

linked to the Cuban Foreign Ministry, many of its students will become Cuban diplomats, and
many of its alumni work in international relations in various Cuban government ministries.
WOLA brought a retired Coast Guard officer, and former senior DHS official, to teach a course
on how U.S. policy is formulated; the idea was, as U.S. –Cuban relations improved, to offer an

10
introduction to U.S. policy making that might help professionalize contacts.

The course was

heavily oversubscribed; participants included graduate students, Foreign Ministry staff, Ministry
of the Interior staff, and several officials from the Ministry of the Armed Forces.

Student

evaluations and subsequent discussions with Cuban Foreign Ministry officials indicated that the
course was very positively received, and that other courses like it would be well received as well.
The interest suggests that within the Cuban government, including the Ministry of the Armed
Forces, there is interest in understanding how the U.S. government works, and interest in contact,
direct or indirect, with U.S. officials who have security related responsibilities.
Beyond that, WOLA’s informal discussions with Cuban academics who follow security
issues, and who are close to some in the Armed Forces, suggest that the Cuban military sees
counter-narcotics issues as a major issue they will have to face in the next few years, and would
be interested in dialogue with their U.S. counterparts about it.
Overall, there are at least modest signals that the Cuban military would be interested in
greater contact with the United States. In the context of the gradual improvements in relations,
which are now taking place, the U.S. military ought to explore these possibilities.
Opportunities for Engagement
What are the opportunities for greater engagement in the near term? There are at least three
issues on which the U.S. might engage the Cuban military.
The first, and most obvious, is counter-narcotics. Through the Coast Guard and the
Cuban Border Guard, there are already relationships and contacts.

These could be expanded

directly, through more formal cooperation arrangements, through bi-lateral discussions and
exchanges, through invitations to Cuban participation in multi-lateral events.

They could be

pursued more cautiously through invitations to academic events, exchanges with retired military
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officials, or participation in study programs.

In either case, there are relatively easy

opportunities in this area to expand U.S.-Cuban military to military contacts.
The second is in the area of counter-terrorism. At key moments (for example in the
immediate aftermath of September 11th), the U.S. and Cuba have had contacts about counterterrorism issues. But, in part because Cuba has been included in the list of “state sponsors of
terrorism,” this contact has been extremely limited. If, as is widely expected, President Obama
removes Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, that formal impediment will be gone.
Cuba, having experienced a number of incidents in which regime opponents planted bombs in
civilian hotels in the late 1990s, views itself as strongly committed to the battle against terrorism.
Recently, Cuba became a member of the South American arm of the Financial Action Task
Force, which sets international standards to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.
U.S. Southern Command staff could explore exchanges, trainings, and other activities with
Cuban military and security officials in the area of counter-terrorism.
The third area has to do with disaster planning and response.

The Cuban military is

actively involved in disaster planning and response inside Cuba, particularly in regard to
hurricanes. Internationally, along with Cuban doctors, Cuban military units have carried out
disaster emergency response activities in a number of countries, including Haiti and Pakistan. In
Haiti and in Pakistsan, U.S. and Cuban units did some informal cooperation, and reportedly U.S.
troops supporting Ebola efforts in Africa have had contacts with Cuban medical personnel.
Given that disaster response is an area of interest for the defense ministers of the Americas, and
for the U.S. military, and given Cuba’s interest and experience, exchanges of experiences,
professional exchanges, joint exercises, might all be areas of possible cooperation and dialogue.

12
What are the problems in moving ahead in these or other areas?
The first of course is that U.S.-Cuban relations, while improving, are still distant and formal.
While the evidence suggests that both sides would like to see the relationship continue to
improve, it is going to do so slowly. Initiatives that sound like a good idea on paper will have to
be carefully tested politically on both sides before they move ahead.
Second of course is that the U.S. government has both legal and policy limitations on
contact with Cuban government officials and Cuban Communist Party officials, and any program
of military to military contacts or exchanges would have to seek policy changes, policy waivers,
or legal exceptions, and would have to be carefully reviewed by policy makers and by counsel.
Beyond these two issues, U.S. officials would have to consider several others.
First would be a set of human rights related issues. The Cuban military is not a major source of
human rights abuses; recent State Department human rights reports on Cuba criticize actions by
Cuban National Police, and by members of the General Directorate of State Security, both
divisions of the Ministry of the Interior. But they do not cite abuses by troops or by officials of
the Ministry of the Armed Forces, and generally the Ministry of the Armed Forces is not directly
involved in the kinds of internal security issues that often produce human rights abuses.
Nonetheless, the Cuban armed forces are part of the governmental structure in Cuba, which has
been widely criticized for its human rights record. Steps toward military to military engagement
would likely draw criticism (even if the engagement were about counter-narcotics, counterterrorism or disaster assistance), and officials supporting such engagement would have to be
prepared to respond and defend the engagement.
A related issue has to do with the blurred line in Cuba between military and civilian roles.
The United States has a long history of clearly defining the role of the military in terms of
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national defense, and a tradition in which the military do not engage in politics, but serve an
elected civilian government. The United States has urged governments in this hemisphere, many
of which have had military governments over the years, to develop clear rules about the
separation of military and civilian roles.

Human rights advocates have urged the U.S.

government to be cautious in its dealings with militaries and governments that do not have such
clear rules, so as not to send a message of U.S. tolerance for military involvement in politics. In
Cuba, the military is deeply involved in the political process; active duty military officers serve
on the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, and are in high-level positions in the Cuban
Communist Party. While many analysts believe that the military is loyal to, and subservient to
the Party and the government, and not an independent actor as it is in other countries, and that
therefore the involvement of military officials in the government is not the threat to civilian rule
that it might be in other countries. Nonetheless, U.S. military engagement with the Cuban
military would have to be sensitive to the perception that it was condoning a role for the military
in politics and civilian affairs.
Similarly, there are issues related to the Cuban military’s involvement in the economy.
While that involvement has made the military, in some ways, an internal force for economic
reform, it has also increased the power of the military relative to economic managers and civilian
government officials.

Like the involvement of the military in politics, the United States has a

long tradition of disapproving of military involvement in the economy, because of the undue
power that comes along with it. (And in a country in the process of economic change, the
troubling prospect looms that as sectors of the Cuban economy move from state to private hands,
military officials could assume oligarchic control of enterprises.) Engagement with the Cuban
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military would have to be sensitive to this issue, and to the perception that we condone military
involvement in the economy.
All these issues can be seen through a slightly different lens than that of the relationship
with countries where we are actively providing financial assistance, training, and political
support.

Engagement with the Cuban military would take place in a different context.

Nonetheless, these are real issues that would have to be considered.
Conclusion
In the new political context of U.S.-Cuban relations, and the process of change in the Cuban
economy, it is in the interest of the United States to explore and develop contacts with the Cuban
military, which will be a political and economic force in Cuba for the foreseeable future. The
principal issue areas that could be explored have to do with counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism,
and disaster planning and response. Contacts both direct and indirect (through academics and
others) could be explored, as could professional exchanges, trainings, observations, and some
joint or multi-lateral exercises. Developing any of these areas will require patience and political
sensitivity, but it is in our interest to do so.

